This paper explores organizational responses to in ‡uence activities -costly activities aimed at persuading decision makers. As Milgrom and Roberts (1988) argued, rigid practices that otherwise seem ine¢ cient can optimally arise. If more complex decisions are more susceptible to in ‡uence activities, optimal selection may partially account for the observed correlation between …rm performance and management-practice quality reported in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) . Further, a …rm's boundaries can be shaped by in ‡uence-activity considerations, providing a theory of the …rm based on ex-post ine¢ ciencies. Finally, boundaries and rigid practices interact: rules under non-integration should be less restrictive than under integration. (JEL D02, D23, D73, D83)
Introduction
In ‡uence activities-costly activities aimed at persuading a decision maker-are commonplace in business relationships both between and within …rms. Employees may spend their otherwise-productive time building credentials and seeking outside opportunities to convince management they should be promoted to a key position (Milgrom and Roberts (1988) ). Division managers may lobby corporate headquarters for larger budgets to pursue pet projects (Wulf (2009) ). Firms may lobby suppliers to provide favorable delivery slots, to give them …rst pick of the highest quality batches of goods, or to assign speci…c personnel to their case. Such in ‡uence activities are privately costly and can lower the quality of decision making, so part of the organizational design problem is to moderate them.
In order to moderate in ‡uence activities, organizations may adopt rigid, seemingly ine¢ -cient, practices. Seniority-based promotion rules may promote less-talented workers or ones who are not a good …t for a position, but they reduce the incentives for workers to waste time "buttering up the boss" (Milgrom (1988) , Milgrom and Roberts (1988) ). Low-powered managerial incentives may sti ‡e motivation, but they can reduce an own-division bias in lobbying for corporate resources (Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ). Closed-door organizational practices that hamper communication may make it dif…cult to implement continuous-improvement initiatives, but a more open policy may invite lobbying.
Moreover, as Milgrom and Roberts (1990) point out, "even the very boundaries of the …rm can become design variables." That is, divesting a business unit can create barriers to in ‡uence (Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) ). In ‡uence activities are not absent between …rms, however-most business relationships are on-going and involve signi…cant relationship speci…city, and hence a …rm does care about (and thus may hope to in ‡uence) what its business partners do.
In this paper, I take moderating in ‡uence activities to be a central goal of designing a …rm's organizational practices and boundaries. As in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , I hold technology, preferences, information, and the legal environment constant across prospective governance structures and ask, for a given transaction with given characteristics, whether the transaction is best carried out within a …rm or between …rms. Giving control over all aspects of the production process to one manager eliminates that manager's incentives to engage in in ‡uence activities but intensi…es the other manager's. Additionally, I ask whether the transaction should be governed by rigid or ‡exible practices. Rigid organizational practices reduce in ‡uence activities but occasionally lead to poor decision making. Of course, di¢ cult transactions will be di¢ cult no matter how they are organized (Gibbons, 2005, p. 220) , but the relative importance of these considerations is determined by the transaction's characteristics. This paper thus delivers a uni…ed account of the costs and bene…ts of alternative governance structures, consistent with Williamson's observation that "substantially the same factors that are ultimately responsible for market failures also explain failures of internal organization" (1973, p. 316) .
To sketch the model's ingredients and results, consider two managers in a working relationship. In the course of their relationship, two decisions must be made. The rights to make these decisions are contractible ex ante, but neither the rights to make decisions nor the actual decisions to be made are contractible ex post.
1 That is, when a particular contingency arises, the managers cannot bargain over the decision that is to be taken; instead, for each decision, the manager with the control right unilaterally chooses his ideal decision given his information. Additionally, there are decision externalities-each manager cares directly about both decisions-because the managers are, at least in the short-run, locked into working with each other (whether within one …rm or in a supply relationship).
The manager in control of a decision must rely on information that can be in ‡uenced by the disempowered manager. The disempowered manager may seek out additional information that favors his view, he may neglect to mention certain points that do not, or he may attempt to tell a story consistent with the facts but heavily biased in its conclusion. In any case, crafting such an argument takes time that would be better spent on more productive tasksthe direct cost of in ‡uence activities is the opportunity cost of the in ‡uencer's time. As such, these costs are convex-engaging in in ‡uence activities crowds out less productive tasks before more productive tasks. Formally, there is an informative but manipulable public signal. Prior to its realization, each manager can manipulate the distribution of this signal so that its realizations appear more favorable for his ideal decision. That is, the managers engage in a signal-jamming game under symmetric uncertainty (Holmstrom (1982 (Holmstrom ( /1999 , Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) ).
As an example, two managers in a vertical chain may care about a common asset such as the reputation of the …nal product that emerges from their production process. The upstream manager may prefer that the reputation be geared toward showcasing the durability of the inputs. The downstream manager may prefer that it emphasize novelty. Decisions must be made regarding the direction to emphasize in a new marketing campaign. Both managers want the …nal product to succeed, and success largely depends on consumers'preferences, which are uncertain. Depending on who is making these decisions, one or both managers may have the incentive to try to persuade the other by, say, altering the phrasing of certain questions that are asked in consumer focus groups. Time spent on crafting such arguments is time spent away from strategic planning and operations oversight.
Non-integration minimizes aggregate in ‡uence costs: divided control leads each manager to try to in ‡uence the other's decision, but these in ‡uence activities crowd out only mundane activities; in contrast, uni…ed control leads the disempowered manager to devote a lot of time to in ‡uence activities, crowding out potentially important tasks. On the other hand, there may be bene…ts to unifying control: coordinating the two decisions could be important, or one manager might simply have more to lose from not having his ideal decision implemented. It may therefore be more e¢ cient to opt for integration and to moderate in ‡uence activities using alternative instruments, such as closed-door policies or restrictions on the discretion of the decision maker. In ‡uence costs may thus shed light on why certain puzzling management practices persist and why they are negatively correlated with performance (as documented by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) ).
2 Adapting a phrase from Prendergast (2003) , when rigid practices perform well, ‡exible practices perform better; but when rigid practices perform poorly, ‡exible practices perform worse. Finally, organizational practices and …rm boundaries interact: rigid organizational practices and integration are complementary; non-integrated relationships should be governed by less restrictive rules than relationships within integrated …rms. To summarize, this paper provides a uni…ed set of answers to two classic questions: (a) why are all transactions not carried out in the market and (b) why are all transactions not carried out within a single large …rm? Williamson (1971) identi…ed between-…rm "haggling" costs as an answer to (a) and, in later works, "bureaucratic costs of hierarchy" (Tadelis, Williamson, 2012) as an answer to (b). Here, I expand Williamson's argument from explicit disputes to ine¢ ciencies in implicit lobbying. This in ‡uence-cost approach suggests re…nements to Williamson's argument. Holding organizational practices constant, unifying control increases in ‡uence costs, in contrast to Williamson's claim that "…at [under integration] is frequently a more e¢ cient way to settle minor con ‡icts" (1971, p.114) : modifying …rm boundaries without adjusting practices does not solve the problem. However, whenever integration is being considered for in ‡uence-cost moderating purposes, it will be accom-panied by rigid organizational practices that appear bureaucratic in spirit. Fiat (uni…ed control) appears e¤ective precisely because it is coupled with bureaucracy. Though costly, bureaucracy is the lesser of two evils. This paper is related to the literature on in ‡uence activities in organizations (Milgrom (1988) , Milgrom and Roberts (1988 , Schaefer (1998) , Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , Laux (2008) , Wulf (2009), Friebel and Raith (2010) , Lachowski (2011) ) but is closest in spirit to Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) who explore the idea that the boundaries of the …rm can serve as design variables to mitigate in ‡uence activities. In their model, divestiture of a division amounts to the choice of a decision rule that cannot depend on the information the division possesses, whereas in my model, divestiture of a division amounts to divided control. I view informational restrictions on decision rules as an additional instrument (as in Milgrom and Roberts (1988) ) and analyze the interaction between the two.
The analysis expands upon Gibbons (2005) , who explores the role of the allocation of a single decision right on equilibrium in ‡uence activities. This paper goes further in that it analyzes the simultaneous choice of boundaries (uni…ed versus divided control) and organizational practices. In doing so, it provides a theory of the …rm based on ex-post ine¢ ciencies. Section 2 describes a simple model of in ‡uence activities and de…nes and characterizes the equilibrium of this in ‡uence-activity model for a given allocation of control (control structure) and set of organizational practices (practices). Section 3 analyzes the optimal control structure for a …xed set of practices, section 4 …xes the control structure and analyzes optimal practices, and section 5 examines the joint optimization over both. Section 6 concludes.
The Model

Description
There are two managers, denoted by L and R and two decisions that must be made, d 1 and d 2 . The payo¤s to the managers for a particular decision depend on an underlying state of the world, denoted by s 2 S. The state of the world is unobserved; however, the two managers can commonly observe an informative but manipulable signal, . The two managers bargain over a control structure g 2 G = fI L ; I R ; N I; RN Ig, where under I j , manager j controls both decisions, under N I, L controls d 1 and R controls d 2 , and conversely under RN I. After the control structure has been chosen, each manager chooses a level of "in ‡uence activities," denoted by i at private cost k ( i ), with k 0 ; k 00 > 0. In ‡uence activities are chosen prior to the observation of the public signal and without any private knowledge of the state of the world, and they a¤ect the conditional distribution of given s. I assume that this e¤ect is linear: = s + i + j + ", where " is a noise term. After the signal has been observed, the manager(s) with control of the decision rights must immediately choose a decision. Further, the managers cannot bargain over a signal-contingent decision rule ex ante.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. L and R bargain over a control structure g 2 G;
2. L and R simultaneously choose (unobservable) in ‡uence activities L ; R 2 R at cost k ( i ), where k is convex and symmetric around zero, with k
3. i and j publicly observe the signal ;
4. The manager with control of decision`chooses d`2 R;
5. Payo¤s are realized.
All random variables are normally distributed (s N (0; h 1 ), " N (0; h 1 " )) and independent, and managers have quadratic costs of in ‡uence,
2 , and gross Two aspects of symmetry have been assumed here. First, the amount by which manager i cares about how close the decision is to his ideal decision is assumed to be the same across decisions. That is, the i coe¢ cient on the loss functions for both decisions is the same. In this model, uni…ed control is desirable, because the manager who cares more about one decision also cares more about the other. An alternative foundation for uni…ed control would be complementarities between the decisions. Secondly, the amount by which the two managers disagree about the ideal decision is equal across decisions. Relaxing this does not qualitatively change any results. Allowing for di¤erent 's across decisions simply adjusts the weights that are placed on each decision in the optimal control-structure choice. Divided control will be referred to as non-integration (and will be denote by g = N I) and uni…ed control as integration (g = I). Though there are four potential allocations of control, only two will ever be optimal: unifying control with manager L or dividing control by giving decision 1 to L and decision 2 to R. This eliminates the need for additional notation for the remaining control structures: R-control and reverse non-integration.
Equilibrium
Suppose manager i has control of a decision. Manager j cares about the decision to be taken and recognizes that this decision depends on i's beliefs. Thus, manager j has a direct interest in what manager i believes and will do whatever is in his power to change i's beliefs. But, as Cyert and March (1963: p. 85) argue, "We cannot reasonably introduce the concept of communication bias without introducing its obvious corollary -'interpretive adjustment.'" That is, manager i recognizes that manager j has the incentive to in ‡uence the signal, and he will correct for this in his beliefs. As in career-concerns/signal-jamming games, this "interpretive adjustment" does not eliminate the incentives to carry out in ‡uence activities, for if the decision maker expected no in ‡uence activities, then the in ‡uencer would have a strong incentive to engage in them. Conditional on a control structure, g, the solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium. Denote manager i's beliefs about the vector of in ‡uence activities by^ (i).
De…nition 1 Given a control structure, g, a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the resulting game consists of choices of in ‡uence activities, L and R ; and a decision function
;^ is chosen optimally by the manager who controls that decision under g, given his beliefs about the state of the world; which depend on conjectures about the level of in ‡uence activities, sj ;^ (i); (2) in ‡uence activities are chosen optimally given the allocation of the decision right; and (3) beliefs are correct:
Let us begin by solving for an equilibrium for an arbitrary control structure g. Suppose manager i has control of decision`under governance structure g. Let denote the equilibrium level of in ‡uence activities. Manager i will choose d `t o minimize his expected loss given his beliefs. Since he faces a quadratic loss function, his decision will be equal to his conditional expectation of the state of the world, given the signal and his conjecture about in ‡uence activities, plus his bias term, i . That is,
The decision manager i chooses di¤ers from the decision manager j 6 = i would choose if he had the decision right for two reasons. First, i 6 = j , so for a given set of beliefs, manager i prefers a di¤erent level of d`than manager j does. Secondly, it may be that, out of equilibrium, beliefs are incorrect. That is, manager i knows i but only has a conjecture about j . The updating rule for normal distributions implies that the conditional expectation of the state of the world from the perspective of individual i is a convex combination of two estimators of the state of the world-the …rst is the prior mean, 0, and the second is a modi…ed signal,
, which must of course satisfy^ i (i) = i , because this is a game of perfect recall. The weight that i's preferred decision rule attaches to the signal is given by the signal-to-noise ratio, ' = h" h+h"
. That is,
Given decision rules d g ( ; ) for`= 1; 2, we can now compute the equilibrium level of in ‡uence activities that each manager will engage in. In ‡uence activities for manager j are more privately bene…cial (out of equilibrium) the greater is the di¤erence between the equilibrium decision rule and manager j's decision rule, the more manager j cares about his loss from having a privately suboptimal decision rule, and the more weight the decision maker places on the manipulable signal. Manager j's level of in ‡uence activities will solve
where N :j is the number of decisions that manager j does not control under governance structure g. Further, since given any beliefs about j , the unique optimal decision rule of manager i is a pure strategy, and given that manager i chooses a pure strategy decision rule, there is a unique value of j satisfying (1). Thus, the focus on pure strategy equilibrium is without loss of generality. These results are captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For a given control structure, there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game that follows. Further, in that subgame-perfect equilibrium, the levels of in ‡uence activities are given by
where N :j is the number of decisions player j does not control and ' = h" h+h"
is the signalto-noise ratio.
All else equal, manager j will choose a higher level of in ‡uence activities the more disagreement ( ) there is, the more he cares about the decision ( j ), and the more informative the signal is ('). This last comparative static can be decomposed further. ' is high the larger is h " (i.e., when the signal is more precise) and the smaller is h (i.e. when there is more ex ante uncertainty). Note that, in contrast to cheap-talk models of strategic communication in which losses depend only on relative disagreement, the losses in this model also depend on the stakes of the decision. The rest of this paper will concern itself with alternative methods of moderating these in ‡uence activities.
Discussion of Assumptions
Before proceeding to characterize the optimal choice of control structure, I will pause to discuss several of the modeling assumptions I have made. Throughout, I assume the two parties are "locked in" with each other, regardless of the allocation of control, and thus each manager directly cares about both decisions. This may be due to asset speci…city, absent which, if one party found the others'decision to be unappealing, he could seek recourse by substituting to an outside party. A richer model might allow for endogenous dependence between the two players. Examining how this endogenous dependence interacts with …rm boundaries is an interesting question.
I also assume that the disagreement between parties stems from private bene…ts, such as career-concerns motives. If the di¤erence in ideal decisions originated from technological aspects, then one potential remedy might be for one manager to buy the other manager's …rm and assets, install his own employee as the new manager of that division, and appropriate all the receipts of that division. If, on the other hand, these di¤erences are due to private bene…ts, then in this proposed solution the newly installed manager has the same incentives as the manager he replaced.
Additionally, in ‡uence activities are assumed to be chosen without knowledge of the underlying state of the world. I show in Appendix B that the qualitative results of this model can also be generated as a separating equilibrium in a noisy signaling game. However, the multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games makes such an approach relatively unappealing.
Formally, in ‡uence activities occur prior to decision making and therefore in ‡uence costs are ex ante, rather than ex-post, ine¢ ciencies. However, whereas malinvestment in the Grossman-Hart-Moore model occurs ex ante both in a formal sense (in that investments occur prior to decision making) and an informal sense (in that the gap in timing between investment decisions such as locating a plant and decision making regarding production quantities is thought of as being large), in ‡uence activities should be thought of as occurring within the "contract execution interval." These are activities that occur very near actual decision making, and as a result, I refer throughout to these costs as being ex-post.
In equilibrium, in ‡uence activities do not negatively a¤ect the quality of decision making. The Milgrom and Roberts (1988) observation that "when... underlying information is so complex that unscrambling is impossible, decision makers will have to rely on information they know is incomplete or inaccurate" is ruled out by the assumption that L and R do not a¤ect the conditional variance of j s. Rather, I am focusing only on the direct private costs associated with in ‡uence activities.
Similarly, in ‡uence activities do not positively a¤ect the quality of decision making. All else equal, an organization may like to provide incentives for information acquisition and discourage in ‡uence activities. But the two need not be separable, and thus I am ruling out potentially bene…cial e¤ects of in ‡uence activities-since an individual must be credible to be persuasive, he must gather useful information in order to in ‡uence a decision maker (see Laux (2008) for recent work along these lines). In a multitask model in which information gathering and in ‡uence activities are both unobserved to the decision maker, a manager's preferred level of information gathering increases in his choice of in ‡uence activities (i.e., the complements from the perspective of the manager) only if the two are cost substitutes. That is, if engaging in more information acquisition (which increases the precision of the public signal) makes it less costly at the margin to choose a higher level of in ‡uence activities (as might be the case if both require the manager to familiarize himself with the ins and outs of a complex problem), then he may prefer to do both in equilibrium. In such a model, there could be multiple pure-strategy equilibria. In this case, if the decision-maker believes that high (low) levels of in ‡uence activities have been chosen, he will place much (little) weight on the signal. This in turn will induce the other manager to choose high (low) levels of in ‡uence activities. This argument parallels the multiplicity of equilibrium argument in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) .
Additionally, I have assumed that while the allocation of control is ex-ante contractible, it is not ex-post contractible. As we will see in Section 3, the central trade-o¤ in the model will be between the costs of maladaptation and the costs of in ‡uence activities. After the in ‡uence activities have been sunk, it will always be desirable to reallocate control so as to reduce the costs of maladaptation. However, if renegotiation of decision rights were to occur after has been realized, the two managers would possess private information regarding their own in ‡uence activities and therefore about the state of the world. Bargaining over the decision-right allocation would occur under asymmetric information and therefore need not result in an e¢ cient allocation. Whether this renegotiation would lead to greater or smaller in ‡uence costs is an interesting question.
Finally, I do not consider the possibility of allocating control to a third party. The relative bene…ts of doing so would depend on the third party's preferences over decisions as well as on how e¤ective in ‡uence activities are in a¤ecting his decisions. If, for example, the third party is an unbiased, but uninformed person in the company's headquarters, then allocating control to him may yield good decision making but at the cost of high levels of in ‡uence activities.
The Coasian Program
Property Rights Theory (Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart and Moore (1990) , and Hart (1995) , hereafter PRT) advanced the methodology for studying the boundaries of the …rm by specifying a common contractual environment across prospective control-right allocations, providing a uni…ed description of the costs and bene…ts of integration. However, PRT assumes ex-post e¢ ciency, via Coasian bargaining, instead focusing on how the allocation of control a¤ects managers' bargaining positions and hence the sensitivity of their expected split of the surplus to their ex-ante investments. While the approach has proven fruitful in a variety of …elds, ex-post ine¢ ciencies are also viewed as important determinants of …rm boundaries, and thus as Hart (2008) points out, "in order to make progress on the Coasian agenda, we must move away from Coase (1960) and back in the direction of Coase (1937) . We need to bring back haggling costs!" But a uni…ed account of Williamson (1971) 's appealing argument that non-integration may produce "haggling," so that decision-making by "…at" under integration may be more e¢ cient has been elusive. This section will develop a framework for analyzing a version of the "haggling" versus "…at" trade-o¤, but a more complete analysis is deferred until section 5.
From the perspective of period 1, before L and R are chosen, the two managers bargain over a control structure, g , correctly anticipating its e¤ects on equilibrium in ‡uence activities (which are unique, conditional on g) as well as on the equilibrium decision rules. I assume that the managers can freely make transfers at this stage, so that the control structure g will be the solution to the following program, which I refer to as the "Coasian program":
; .
Because managers'payo¤ functions are quadratic, we can use a mean-variance decomposition of the …rst term in W (g):
That is, ex-ante expected welfare can be decomposed into the sum of three costs: (1) an adaptation cost that arises from basing decisions on a noisy signal rather than directly on the state of the world; (2) an alignment cost that is due to the fact that for each decision, one manager will not be able to implement his ideal decision rule; and (3) an in ‡uence-cost component, which can be interpreted as "haggling costs." The exact expressions for these terms are derived in proposition 5 in the appendix. The ADAP term does not depend on the control structure, so g is chosen to minimize the sum of ALIGN (g) and IN F L (g). Two polar cases help identify the relevant trade-o¤. First, let us look at a "pure adaptation" model in which k ( ) = 1 for all 6 = 0, so that in ‡uence activities are impossible by assumption. To minimize alignment costs, the managers want to allocate control of both decisions to the manager who has more to lose from not having his ideal decision rule implemented. Since L R , the optimal control structure involves unifying control with manager L (g = I).
Next, consider a "pure in ‡uence" model in which k ( ) = 1 2 2 and L = R . Under any control structure, each decision will be away from one of the manager's ideal decisions. Since L = R , both managers care equally about the resulting loss. That is, ALIGN (g) does not depend on g and thus the control structure will be chosen to minimize in ‡uence costs. Here, the managers will optimally choose to divide control. To see why, notice that by proposition 1, the total amount of time wasted on in ‡uence activities ( P j j ) is independent of g. Since in ‡uence costs are convex, IN F L (g) is minimized under divided control. That is, g = N I is optimal. This result is true for any increasing and convex cost function k with k 0 log-concave. (See Proposition 7 in the appendix) This is satis…ed for k ( ) = c for all
In the richer model in which = R and L > R , these opposing forces lead to a nontrivial trade o¤, provided L is not too large relative to R . There is a critical value of the signal-to-noise ratio ' such that if ' < ' , control will optimally be uni…ed and if ' > ' , control will optimally be divided. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume R < L < p 3 R . Divided control is optimal if and only if
The condition that manager L cares more about the decision than manager R but not too much more (i.e. L < p 3 R ) is best understood by considering the case in which manager R is essentially indi¤erent about both decisions ( R 0) but manager L is not. Then it is clear that control should be uni…ed with manager L. Also, note that the level of disagreement, , does not matter for the optimal control structure. The reason for this is that with quadratic preferences and quadratic in ‡uence costs, both ALIGN and IN F L are proportional to 2 and thus di¤erences in 2 do not a¤ect the relative trade-o¤ between minimizing alignment costs and in ‡uence costs. More generally, an increase in makes integration relatively less appealing if k 000 > 0 and makes integration relatively more appealing if k 000 < 0.
When are in ‡uence costs large relative to alignment costs? Condition (2) implies that whenever the signal-to-noise ratio is large, the costs of integration exceed the costs of nonintegration. Further unpacking ' (which is equal to h" h+h"
), non-integration is preferred whenever the level of ex-ante uncertainty is high (i.e. h small) or the signal is very informative (i.e. h " large) and thus will be relied heavily upon. In ‡uence-activity moderation therefore provides a basis for a theory of the optimal control structure.
In Gibbons (2005) 's single decision-right model, control should always be allocated to the party who cares more, because that party has more to lose if it does have control, and it will also engage in more in ‡uence activities than the other party would. In contrast, this model captures a trade-o¤ between alignment costs and in ‡uence costs. Incidentally, if one allows for heterogeneous costs
for some 2 (0; 1). Allocating control to L reduces alignment costs but increases in ‡uence costs, because R has a lower marginal cost of engaging in in ‡uence activities. In contrast, in the present model, starting from divided control and allocating a second decision right to L reduces alignment costs but increases in ‡uence costs because doing so increases (decreases) the private marginal bene…t of in ‡uence activities for R (L). Since k is convex, the cost of R's additional in ‡uence activities exceed the gains from L's reduced in ‡uence activities.
In what sense does the trade-o¤ between alignment costs and in ‡uence costs resemble the classic "haggling" versus "…at" trade-o¤? Interpreting the opportunity costs of in ‡uence activities as the costs of "haggling," this model generates the prediction that such costs should be greater under integration than under non-integration, in contrast to Williamson's claim that "…at [under integration] is frequently a more e¢ cient way to settle minor con ‡icts... than is haggling [under non-integration]" (1971, p. 114) . Put di¤erently, this model suggests that the cost of "…at" (interpreted here as uni…ed control) is an increase in haggling, and thus the current model does not deliver the Williamson (1971) trade-o¤. This will be resolved in section 5, which allows for integration to be coupled with organizational practices aimed at reducing "haggling."
Alternative Instruments to Reduce In ‡uence Costs
Rigid Organizational Practices
The previous section emphasized the scope for allocating control to moderate in ‡uence activities (Proposition 2). However, as Milgrom and Roberts (1988, 1992) highlight, there are many other methods available for achieving this goal. Recall that under a control structure in which party i controls N :j decision rights, manager j's equilibrium in ‡uence activities are j j j = N :j j ' (Proposition 1). In the context of this model, therefore, any corporate policy that reduces ; , or ' will reduce equilibrium in ‡uence activities. Closed-door policies in which decision makers are insulated from relevant information would result in a reduction in h " and hence '. Low-powered incentive schemes and shrinking the size of operations could reduce . Pursuit of a focused strategy in which managers agree on their ideal decisions would correspond to reducing . Hiring outside consultants to acquire independent information about the state of the world might increase h, thereby reducing '.
None of these policies is costless, however. A …rm that is smaller or narrower than its technology and capabilities would dictate forgoes pro…table opportunities. Low-powered incentives sti ‡e managerial motivation. "Defensive information acquisition" by an outsider who, by de…nition, is not an insider and thus not privy to the relevant information, is costly. While all these policies are important in real organizations, their costs are exogenous to the present model, so I will focus on one with endogenous costs: closed-door policies.
Assume party L has both decision rights. The model is as above, except that in the …rst period, instead of bargaining over the control structure, L and R bargain over whether or not to carry out their relationship under an open-or closed-door policy. They may trim out personnel whose job it is to gather relevant information, they may purposefully load up their schedules and keep themselves too busy to pay attention to everything that crosses their desks, or they may limit the frequency and length of meetings with each other. Let 2 = f0; 1g denote this choice. Under an open-door policy (denoted by = 0), the rest of the game proceeds as usual. Under a closed-door policy (denoted by = 1), no public signal is realized in period 3. Let W ( ) denote the expected ex-ante equilibrium welfare under organizational practice . The Coasian program is
If no public signal is realized, neither manager will have the incentive to exert any in‡uence over it, and thus L = R = 0. This is potentially worthwhile if manager R would otherwise have a strong incentive to in ‡uence the signal (i.e. if ' is large). Since there is no additional information on which to base his decisions, L will set both decisions equal to the prior mean. If the prior is very imprecise (i.e. h is small), this is potentially very costly, but if there is already a wealth of information (i.e. h is large) about the decision to be made, then it might not be very costly to have a closed door policy. This is captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a function ( ; L ; R ) that is increasing in L and decreasing in R and such that when control is uni…ed, a closed door policy ( = 1) is preferred to an open door policy ( = 0) whenever 'h > ( 2 ; L ; R ).
Proposition 5 in the appendix allows for a more convex set of policies. For example, if ' denotes the signal-to-noise ratio, the players could bargain over a level of "noise" they could put into the signal, which reduces h " up to the point where the e¤ective signal-to-noise ratio is given by (1 ) '. This can be interpreted as shutting o¤ certain, but not all, lines of communication. The rest of the analysis would proceed similarly.
I assume that the managers are able to commit to these rigid practices. However, if putting these practices in place deters in ‡uence activities, the managers would always …nd it mutually bene…cial to eliminate these practices at the last minute-the standard timeinconsistency problem of rigid rules applies here. Organizations have many ways of committing to these types of practices, however-executives may overload their schedules to make themselves scarce, decision makers might physically locate themselves away from those who seek their attention, actual decision making may be carried out by hard-headed, "by the books" types for whom it is no use to try to persuade, or decisions may be made excessively early before useful information arrives.
Empirical Implications
The logic of in ‡uence-activity moderation can help shed light on why certain rigid organizational practices persist. A recent series of papers starting with Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) documents substantial dispersion in management practices across …rms, and in particular, highlights the prevalence of …rms with puzzling ("bad") management practices. They conduct a survey inquiring about eighteen speci…c management practices of individual manufacturing plants (e.g. about whether or not the …rm adopts continuous-improvement initiatives, the criteria the …rm uses for promotions, and so on). Each response is scored on a 1 5 scale, with 1 being considered a "bad" management practice and a 5 being considered "good," and a …rm's management score is a normalized average of the scores for each individual practice. Firms with higher management scores perform better (have higher sales, higher pro…tability, are less likely to exit, and have greater sales growth) than …rms with lower management scores.
The negative correlation between "bad" management practices and …rm performance is consistent with selection, as the following …gure illustrates.
Figure 1: Endogenous Practice Selection
A …rm operating in an environment with greater levels of disagreement (i.e. with a higher ) will, all else equal, perform worse than a …rm with a lower . Further, such a …rm will be plagued by greater in ‡uence activities (since j is increasing in ) and thus will …nd that adopting a closed-door policy is relatively more appealing. There will be some cuto¤ value such that …rms with < will choose open-door policies and have better performance and …rms with > will choose closed-door policies and have worse performance. Thus, a simple selection story along these lines could account for a negative correlation between closed-door policies ("bad" management practices) and …rm performance.
Further, since …rms choose their management practices optimally, any outside intervention resulting in a change in management practices would lead to a decrease in …rm e¢ ciency. In particular, an intervention aimed at altering management practices for poorly performing …rms would lead to a decrease in the performance of such …rms. This view is consistent with the "Management as Design" perspective discussed in Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2013) . The argument, of course, assumes that management practices are chosen optimally. To the extent that certain practices are not adopted due to managerial unawareness or mis-takes, such interventions could potentially improve the performance of …rms (see Bloom, et. al., 2012) .
Practices and Control
Transactions within integrated …rms appear to be governed by more bureaucratic rules than transactions across …rm boundaries. Indeed, many have proposed such bureaucracy costs of integration as the solution to the question, "Why can't a large …rm do everything that a collection of small …rms can do and more?" (Williamson, 1985, p. 131) by replicating whatever the small …rms would do, except in cases where there is potential for joint improvements. For example, Masten argues that the "[bene…ts] of internalizing successive transactions is limited by... bureaucratic ine¢ ciencies..." (1984, p. 406) . But, if integration is viewed as uni…ed control bundled with ine¢ cient bureaucracy, this naturally begs the question of why can we not unify control without the concomitant ine¢ cient bureaucracy, perhaps through the contractual allocation of control rights?
In section 3, I argued that unifying control does in fact improve ex-post decision making. But unifying control (whether contractually or otherwise) increases the incentives for in ‡uence activities. In this section, I will argue that when both the bene…ts from improving ex-post decision making as well as the increased in ‡uence costs from unifying control are large, it may be optimal to supplement uni…ed control with rigid organizational practices. Rigid organizational practices actually improve the e¢ ciency of uni…ed control: "ine¢ cient bureaucracy" is not the problem, it is a solution to the underlying problem. The model is similar to the model in the previous section, except now L and R bargain over the control structure in addition to rigid/ ‡exible organizational practices. That is, in the …rst period, L and R bargain over (g; ) 2 G = fI; N Ig f0; 1g. The rest of the analysis proceeds as above.
I begin by introducing some terminology. A choice of g is referred to as a control structure, and a choice of is referred to as an organizational practice. A governance structure is the joint choice of a pair (g; ), as it forms a complete description of how the transaction is to be governed. Only three governance structures will be chosen in equilibrium: (I; 0) ; (I; 1), and (N I; 0). I refer to these, respectively, as directed transaction, hierarchy, and market. In a directed transaction, control is uni…ed and there are ‡exible organizational practices. Markets are characterized by divided control and ‡exible organizational practices. The de…ning feature of hierarchy is that decision making is carried out by …at-all relevant decisions are made by a single decision maker (control is uni…ed), and rigid organizational practices are adopted.
Under either control structure, setting = 1 eliminates the incentive for (and hence the presence of) in ‡uence activities. Given that the costs of in ‡uence activities is zero when = 1 for both g = I and g = N I, it is clear that g = I will be preferred whenever = 1. Closed-door policies are thus inconsistent with non-integration. Fixing = 0, Proposition 2 implies that there will be some' such that non-integration is preferred if and only if ' >'. Let W (g; ) denote the expected equilibrium welfare under control structure g and organizational practice . It can be shown that
where the exact expressions for these three components are given in Appendix A. The Coasian program is therefore
fW (g; )g :
It is worth noting that the only term that depends on both the control structure and the organizational practices is IN F L (g; ). The intuition described above suggests that This implies the empirical proposition that transactions within …rms will be more ruledriven and rigid than transactions carried out in the market, which has been discussed by Williamson, "Interorganizational con ‡ict can be settled by …at only rarely, if at all... intraorganizational settlements by …at are common... ." (1971, emphasis in the original)
The following …gure describes the full solution to the model for di¤erent regions of the parameter space. There are three boundaries of note. I refer to the vertical boundary between "Directed Transaction" and "Market" as the "Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts boundary": a …rm rife with politics should perhaps disintegrate. This is consistent with recent empirical work by Forbes and Lederman (2009) , which argues that the main obstacle to integration between major airlines and regional carriers in the United States is that integration invites the regional carrier's work force to lobby for higher pay, as it is comparatively less wellcompensated than the major's. The diagonal boundary between "Directed Transaction" and "Hierarchy," discussed in more detail in section 4, is the "Milgrom and Roberts boundary": rigid decision-making rules should sometimes be adopted within …rms. The presence of these two boundaries highlights the idea that non-integration and rigid organizational practices are substitute mechanisms: sometimes a …rm will prefer to control in ‡uence activities with the former and sometimes with the latter.
Figure 2: Optimal Governance Structures
Of primary interest is the third boundary, which I refer to as the "Williamson boundary". Sometimes, the market mechanism, with its high-powered incentives and open lines of communication invites such high levels of in ‡uence activities ("haggling") that it should be superseded by a hierarchy (uni…ed control) coupled with rigid organizational practices. This becomes increasingly true the greater is the level of ex post disagreement between the parties ( ) and the greater is the level of ex ante uncertainty (as measured by a small value of h or a large value of ').
These predictions are consistent with the …ndings of many of the classic empirical papers in support of Transaction Cost Economics (see, for example, Masten (1984) , Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991 ), Lieberman (1991 ), Hanson (1995 ), which …nd positive correlations between a …rm's vertical integration decisions and (a) measures of ex-post lock-in and (b) measures of contractual incompleteness. Since lock-in is a necessary component of ex-post disagreement, existing empirical proxies for ex-post lock-in (typically some measure of speci…city) also serve as measures of ex-post disagreement. Additionally, these papers use measures of the uncertainty or complexity of the environment a …rm operates in as the empirical proxy for the level of contractual incompleteness, which is the actual object of interest in TCE. These particular measures are also reasonable proxies for the scope for ex-post in ‡uence activities.
Figure 3 below depicts the relationship between the level of uncertainty surrounding a transaction and the potential "haggling" costs under each of the three potential governance structures. The bold segments depict the actual "haggling" costs under the optimal governance structure. In section 3, I argued that the cost of uni…ed control was an increase in "haggling." Holding organizational practices …xed, this is indeed the case, as shown by the di¤erence between the Inf l (N I; = 0) and Inf l (I; = 0) lines. However, changing organizational practices in addition to the control structure completely eliminates "haggling," as shown by the di¤erence between the Inf l (N I; = 0) and Inf l (I; = 1) lines. A …rm with ' > ' that decides to integrate will adopt rigid organizational practices, opting for unresponsive decision making by "…at" rather than responsive decision making and "haggling." (Tadelis and Williamson (2012, p. 17) ) this model views the bureaucratic costs of hierarchy as the lesser of two evils, the alternative to which is high levels of in ‡uence activities. By endogenizing the costs of bureaucracy, we obtain a result that is analogous to Williamson's argument that low-powered incentives complement integration, "Incentives... are adapted to the attributes of each organizational alternative. To attempt to 'hold the rules as nearly constant as possible,'on the theory that what works well in one regime ought to apply equally to another, is thus mistaken." (1985, p. 140) Rigid organizational practices, like low-powered incentives, should be chosen in conjunction with …rm boundaries with the goal of aligning both to the environment in which the organization operates.
Empirically, this implies that the bureaucratic costs of hierarchy are endogenous and determined by the model's parameters. The most common interpretation of the standard regressions in the empirical TCE literature, in which a dummy for integration are regressed on a measure of speci…city and a measure of uncertainty, is that the error term represents an orthogonal, unmeasurable bureaucracy cost. That such costs are unmeasurable and potentially correlated with the theory's two key variables is potentially problematic.
In this model, the costs of bureaucracy associated with integration,
are independent of the level of disagreement ( ) but are increasing in the level of uncertainty. Accordingly, in a regression of integration on uncertainty and speci…city, the coe¢ cient on uncertainty would be biased downwards (as transactions which have high levels of uncertainty will also have high levels of bureaucracy costs, making such transactions less likely to be integrated than they would be absent bureaucracy costs). If speci…city and uncertainty are uncorrelated, then the coe¢ cient on speci…city would be unbiased. The inability to measure bureaucracy costs could therefore be partly responsible for David and Han's (2004) and Carter and Hodgson's (2006) observations that the TCE evidence has (a) largely supported the hypothesis that speci…city drives integration but has (b) found considerably less support for the hypothesis that uncertainty drives integration.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a uni…cation of Williamson's (1971 Williamson's ( , 1975 Williamson's ( , 1985 theory of "haggling costs" between …rms as the central costs of market exchange with Milgrom and Roberts's (1988 view that "in ‡uence costs" are the central costs of internal organization.
To counterbalance the costs of haggling between …rms, Williamson introduced "costs of bureaucracy" within …rms; likewise, to counterbalance in ‡uence costs within …rms, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) introduced "bargaining costs" between …rms. Both Williamson and Milgrom and Roberts thus depart from Williamson's observation that "substantially the same factors that are ultimately responsible for market failures also explain failures of internal organization." (1973, p. 316) In this paper, in contrast, the costs of market exchange and the costs of internal organization have common origins and can be reduced by appropriately chosen governance structures. Organizational practices and …rm boundaries are chosen to reduce the amount of time managers waste persuading decision makers within and between organizations. Williamson's (1971) argument that "Fiat... is frequently a more e¢ cient way to settle minor con ‡icts" holds here only because …at (uni…ed control) is coupled with rigid organizational practices ensuring ex-post ine¢ ciency. This resulting bureaucracy is the lesser of two evils, the alternative to which is high levels of in ‡uence activities.
At this point in the literature, a proposed theory of the …rm cannot stand on its own but must instead connect with existing and prospective empirical literatures. This paper does so in three ways. First, the model broadly coincides with the main empirical predictions and …ndings of TCE (Shelanski and Klein (2005) , Lafontaine and Slade (2007) , Macher and Richman (2008) ). Second, in endogenizing bureaucracy, it explains how existing empirical …ndings may have been biased against …nding support for the TCE hypothesis that uncertainty drives integration, consistent with the …ndings of David and Han (2004) and Carter and Hodgson (2006) . Finally, the model connects to recent empirical work on topics not usually studied in TCE (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) ).
This paper explores only a narrow set of instruments available to the …rm for moderating in ‡uence activities. In addition to choosing rigid organizational practices, a …rm might choose to forego potentially pro…table opportunities to expand its scope in order to maintain accord among its managers. Organizational focus on a narrow business strategy then arises because breadth is necessarily accompanied by in ‡uence activities. Similarly, for a given level of disagreement between managers, a …rm may choose not to expand its existing operations, because doing so may raise each managers' stake in each others' decisions and therefore their incentives to engage in in ‡uence activities. Staying small may then be another way of moderating in ‡uence activities. In ‡uence costs may therefore provide a foundation for decreasing returns to both scale and scope at the organization level.
Analyzing how repeated interaction interacts with in ‡uence activities would be an interesting avenue for future research. On the one hand, managers engaged in a long-term relationship can use the shadow of the future to better align current decision making, reducing the incentives for in ‡uence activities. On the other hand, such considerations may be insu¢ cient for creating alignment for very important decisions. Further, the commitment power derived from long-term relationships may foster the implementation of rigid rules for such decisions. A situation may then arise in which relatively inconsequential decisions are made e¢ ciently and are not in ‡uenced, while more substantial decisions are made via rigid rules.
Finally, in addition to providing a theory of the boundaries of the …rm, the logic of in ‡uence-cost moderation also provides a theory of control structures within …rms. In a related project, using the framework of the recent papers by Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) emphasizing coordination versus local adaptation, I derive a simple trade-o¤. Centralizing control with a third-party headquarters facilitates coordination, but it does so at the expense of high levels of in ‡uence activities. Decentralization hampers coordination but reduces in ‡uence activities. Just as integration and rigid organizational practices are complementary, centralized decision making and rigid organizational practices are also complementary, and both will be adopted when the …rm is operating in a more di¢ cult environment. These results are consistent with the Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) empirical …ndings of positive correlations between decentralization and the quality of management practices and between decentralization and …rm performance. Further, these three components can be expressed as
2 1 2
Proof. Suppose the managers have agreed upon a control structure g and a level of organizational practices 2 [0; 1]. The variance of the signal is then given byh " = (1 ) h"h h+ h" , which reduces the signal-to-noise ratio in the updating formula to (1 ) '. Condition (1) then implies that The bracketed term can be decomposed into sum of the a variance and a bias term. Since the for decision`is 0 if i controls`under g, the bias term is equal to ALIGN (g; ) given above. The variance term is given by
4 A choice of is de…ned as a¤ecting the noise of the signal such that the signal-to-noise ratio becomes (1 )
which is the desired result.
Proposition 6 In this model, when control is uni…ed, a closed door policy ( = 1) is preferred to an open door policy ( = 0) whenever 'h > ( 2 ; L ; R ),where ( 2 ; L ; R ) is increasing in L and decreasing in R and 2 .
Proof. Applying proposition 7, W (I; 1; ) > W (I; 0; ) whenever
2 ; L ; R ; and clearly satis…es the described comparative statics.
Proposition 7 For a general increasing, convex cost function k, in the pure in ‡uence model in which L = R = , divided control is optimal if k 0 is log-concave. This condition is satis…ed for k ( ) = c for all > 1.
Proof. Under non-integration, jk 0 ( j )j = j j ' and under integration, L = 0 and k 0 ( R ) = 2 j j '. Total in ‡uence costs are 2k (k 0 1 (j j ')) under non-integration and k (k 0 1 (2 j j ')) under integration. A su¢ cient condition for the latter to be larger is that the function k (k 0 1 (x)) is convex in x. Let h (x) = k 0 1 (x). Then
Finally, note that
1 2 > 0 whenever > 1.
Appendix B: Interim Signaling Version
Suppose there are two decision rights. Consider the game with the following timing:
2. s L 2 S is drawn and observed by L (but not R) and s R 2 S is drawn and observed by R (but not L);
3. L and R simultaneously choose in ‡uence activities L ; R at costs 
Suppose L has control of N :R decisions, and suppose L conjectures the equilibrium strategy R (s R ) of R. He chooses each decision d to solve
Given this decision rule, R chooses R (s R ) to solve
Taking …rst-order conditions (and imposing the equilibrium restriction that L (s L ) = 0)
Taking expectations of both sides, E [ R (s R )j R ] = N :R R , and therefore R (s R ) = N :R R . The incentives to in ‡uence the signal are thus the same in this model as in the baseline model with ' = 1.
